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THE HUNGARIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN TENSION BE'I'WEEN 
LOYALTY AND OPPOSITION* 
by Emmerich Andras 
Dr . Emmerich Andra s ,  S . J .  has previou sly contributed 
to OPREE ( s ee Vol . IV , No . 1 ,  Vol . IV , No . 2 ,  and 
Vol . II , No. 5} . A native of Hungary , he is 
currently living in Vienna and directs the Hungarian 
In stitute for Sociology of Rel igion . He is a 
prolific writer in the area of Hungarian church 
is sue s .  
In its more than thousand-year hi story the Hungarian Catholic 
Church practically never expe rienced , with the excepti on of short 
episode s ,  unc ertainties in its loyalties in rega rd to the state. Saint 
St efhen founded the Church in Hungary , and it was this same Stephen , 
Hunga ry's first king , who established the state. State and church had 
continual ly--so to speak , shoulder to shoulder--pursued the same goal , 
namel y to be concerned with the spiritua l and physical well-being of the 
people.·  The state exten sively supported the church ; and the church , in 
re turn , sided with the state by actively participating in the formation 
and le adership of public l i f e .  Such was the situation at the end of 
Worl d War I I : Catho licism wa s the religion of the state.  Bec aus e  of 
their official position , the bishops were members· of the Upper House and 
consequentl y members of the law-making body of the land . The Archbishop 
of Eszte rgom maintained the right of " homo-regiu� "--at the very least 
according to law texts . Th e pri esthood wa s protected by the law and 
ben efitted as holde rs of public offic e .  
Thi s situation was brought to an abrupt end following the change in 
r egimes at the end of the wa r .  For a decade and a half the church 
su ffe red outright pe rsecution . Lat er there developed what appea red to be 
an epoch-making change in relation ship between church and state : legal 
separation . As events of the past 3 5  years demonstrated , however , that 
was true only on pape r ;  in fact , r elations between church and state 
continue in their c enturi es-old pattern , with a shift in power decidedly 
*Translated from German , " Di e  Unga risch e Kirche in Spannungsfeld von 
L oyalitat u nd  Opposition , "  in St:i:mmen der Welt (Munich} , No . 2 0 2 , 2 
(1983) with pe rmi s sion of author and publisher . 
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in favor of the state.  This not only applies to the period of 
confrontation under Cardinal Mindszenty , but. also to the cur rent era of 
adjus tment by the church to the de sires of the state . 
A frequently recurring theme in the interviews and studies refe r­
ri ng to Hungarian church politics is the reproach that the church 
leadership is all too f lexible , if not to say complai sant . The position 
of the Polish Bishops' Conference is mo st often mentioned in this 
context as a comparison . In this respec t ,  many yea rs ago the Poli sh 
bi shops criticized the Hunga rian episcopate , saying that if the 
Hunga rian bishops had been les s  subservient ·then the Poles would have 
had an easier time defe nding their independence against governmental 
enc roa chment. Nor would they need to guard themselves against the 
reproach es made by their state , pointing to the example of their 
Hunga rian colleague s ,  after whose model the Polish government wanted to 
mo ld them to be more cooperative . 
When John Pau l  I I  wa s selected for the papacy the Hungarian govern­
ment a s  well as the hierarchy fea red that the "Po lish" pope would apply 
st ricter criteria in the futur e  "Ostpolitik " of the Vatican . Aft e r  all , 
one of the rrost significant results of Rome • s "Ostpolitik " up· to that 
tim e wa s the normalization of the rel ationship between church and state 
in Hunga ry . The pope did not j ustify these apprehensions .  He was not 
concerned with changing the political positions of the Vatican ; rather , 
h e  wan t ed to bring about pas toral renewal and ,  through this , the revival 
of the Hungarian Church . 
Th e Hunga rian politicians understandably disliked hearing any 
reference to the Polish example , and they also did not want comparisons 
drawn relevant to the distinct situa tion in both countries.  The 
Hunga rian bishops regarded these comparisons as un j ustified , in 
pa rticu lar becaus e the Hu nga rian people , in contrast to the Pol e s ,  are 
denominationally divided , a nd Hungary • s true believers do not stand by 
their bi shops in the same way a s  is the case with the Poles .  
Furthermore , it must not be ove rlooked that , in the average 
Hu nga ri an ' s aw arenes s ,  a conf lict between church and state is fundament­
ally alien. The "national soul " traditionally longs for the working­
toge ther of the state and church for the wel l-being of the people .  In 
Poland the re appear s  even here a difference: t he Polish people have 
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always been more drawn toward the church than to the state. An 
ad ditional factor to be considered when making a Polish-Hungarian 
c omparison is that the situation after the war was fundamentally 
di fferent. While the Polish bishops and the future political leaders of 
the country were languishing together in German concentration camps, and 
the relationship between the church and state thus had a common basis, 
the new state leadership in Hungary was opposed to the leading 
ec clesiastical personalities, who played an act ive part in the public 
life of the previous regime and, consequently, could really be marked as 
opponents to the new regime. 
Goals of the State 
A description of the oppression that the state carried out against 
the church is not the topic here. It is more important to look at the 
state's objectives. Its first aim was the complete exclusion of the 
church fr om public life--as a social factor of power. To achieve this 
goal, rul ers in the early 195 0s were willing to use any means. 
Practically all that remained for the church, robbed of nearly all its 
institutions, was a certain freedom of worship which alone confirmed its 
existenc e. Simultaneously, the church was reproached--as justification 
for the rigorous actions t.aken against it--for past mistakes (including 
deeds which were later construed as mistakes) . .  
An additional goal of the state was reorganizing the church in such 
a way that it fit into the state's pol itical concept. One of the means 
for attaining this was the establishment of the "Priests For Peace" 
movement on August 1, 195 0. In the beginning, its members acted within 
the scope of the catholic country-wide peace council as internal church 
opposition to the bishops; later they became ecclesiastical confidants 
of the state. To prevent an inner fissure of the clergy, the bishops, in 
19 5 7, brought into existence their own ecclesiastical peace undertaking, 
named "Opus Eacis," that was to serve as a framework for the participa­
tion of the clergy in the peace movement. From the two peace movements 
there arose, after a short period , a series of personal unions: the same 
people took over the same office in both movements, and "collective" 
meetings were held. In practice, however, it happened that in the end 
the church itself legitimized the ecclesiastical peace movement. A 
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s chism of the priesthood was actually avo ided, but the reputa tion of the 
church suffered. The ·state hurried to ensure that those clergymen who 
cooperat ed with the state appea red relatively believable .. A tested means 
in cases such as thi s, for example, was the custom of surrounding the 
priest who was loyal to the state with eager chaplains, therew i th 
guaranteeing a good spiritual adv isor. 
Of substantial importance for the continuing developnent of the 
church-state relationship was the agreement signed on August 30, 1 �50, 
betwe en the Hunga rian government and repr esentatives of the Hungarian 
Bis hops ' Conference. The agreement s tated , in pa rt, a desire for 
" pe aceful coexistence betwe en the state and the catholic Church , and 
the r ewith also the un ity of the Hunga rian people . . . as  well as 
fostering the peaceful developnent of our homeland." With this 
agreement, the assembly of bis hops pledged , among other things, "that it 
; 
will proceed appropriately· against any church members who oppose the 
legal order of the Peoples' Republic of Hungary or who interfere w ith 
the government's social improvements" and " that under no cond i tions w ill 
misuses of religious convictions of believers or activi ties of the 
Catholic Chur ch whi ch aim at political goals contrary to the regime's 
interest be permitted . "  Thi s agreement indeed could be interpreted as 
agreeing with the ecclesiastical s tatute s, but actually it opened up all 
kinds of political inte rpretations by the state based on its vague 
word ing . As a result of the arbi trary interpretation, such paradoxical 
s i tuations arose , for example, whi ch made it impos sible for the diocesan 
bi shop to defend hi s pri ests when they were tried because of 
"unpermit ted" pastoral activities; the bishop even had to personally 
en act disciplinary sanctions and oversee their enforcement .  
P eacef ul Coexistence 
These fruits of the Stalin era, including admin istrative measures 
and an agreement open to va rious political interpretations ,  resulted in 
th e state's rega rding church policy a s  "historically developed . "  A 
status qu£ was established, and this served as a starting point for 
consolidation, whi ch in political termi nology is called "peaceful 
co-exi stence." 
Within thi s context, on September 1 5, 1 96 4 ,  a shared ag reement was 
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signed--a preliminary one- -by the Holy See and the Hungarian government, 
in which the atheistic state acknowled ged the Vatican as a responsible 
negotiating partner in all important affairs of the Hungarian Church. It 
resulted in bi-annual negotiations on all unresolved questions. A 
visible result of these regular negotiations is the appointment of 
bishops from among that circle of persons who enjoy the confidence of 
both the Vatican and the Hungarian state. On February 5, 1 9 74, the 
Archbishopric of Esztergom was declared vacant. In 1 976 it was filled by 
Dr. Laszlo Ikkai, and the Hungarian hierarchy now can be regarded as 
restored . It was Cardinal Lekai, the Primate of the Hungarian Church, 
who embossed the future developnent of ecclesiastical life throu gh 
legislative measures and church-political practices. 
The strong church-political system that the new Hungarian Primate 
establ ished holds to the principle that the legal foundation is the 
Constitution, especially the declaration regarding the rights and 
responsibilities of citizens. In a stu dy of this text, a member of the 
Academy, Imre Szabo, interprets this by means of the international 
category of human rights correspond ing to fixed rights of the citizen: 
"What one refers to as human rights on an international level, . 
means . nothing else but the formulation of the basic rights of the 
citizens within the state. The Constitution of the Hungarian People 1 s 
Republic offers a framework for these rights, with which it declares 
that the observation of these rights are indivisibly bound together with 
the compliance to the civil duties. The Constitution also establishes 
that these civil rights and duties are determined by laws of the 
Hungarian People 1 s Republic. " 1 Human rights are viewed in this way. 
Therewith the right to religious freedom depends upon a double 
cond ition: the performance of civil responsibilities and the adherence 
to other. legal provisions. 
Now, however, the state, which serves as an instrument of the 
Party, is by no means neutral in the construction of socialism. Instead 
it undertakes the expansion of the "scientific" worldview and sees to 
the lawful structure to which the church must commit itself. Andras 
Hollo believes "The statutes regarding religious instruction can be 
regarded as basic gua:r·antees of religious freedom. These legal 
norms . . . further reflect those political principl es which offer the 
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foundation for the sociali st freedom of conscience as a civil right 
gua ranteed and practiced . "2 
Th ese measure s  provide the state with so-called "well-ordered con­
dition s , " that warrant the utmost transparency and pos sibilities for 
control by the state . The provisions of the law whi ch the church was 
pres sured to accept divide the individual religious operations. into a 
scheme consisting of three parts,  namely legal ,  not legal , and illegal 
operation s .  The administrative agencies of the state are the ones who 
catego rize the areas of church activities according to these criteri a .  
Practically all legal functions a re controlled by the " State Office for 
Church Affairs" and even enjoy a certain degr ee of state protection . 
Other operations could- -according to governmental understanding --damage 
the internal orde r and , therefore , fall unde r the j urisdi ction of the 
Department of the Interior.  The terms "legal , "  "not legal , "  and 
" illegal"  are important categories for the church , and the differences , 
especially their rigid demarcation ,  is of great import to church 
politics.  Sinc e ,  in reality , differences that separate the legal from 
the illegal are often minute , the above-mentioned d epartments and 
agencies work together closely and transfer a matter from one to 
anothe r .  
Because of the many regulations that fall under the j uri sd iction of 
the government office for church affair s ,  this authority has not only 
th e potential to legi slatively control but also to influence the 
direction of the life of the church . In this manner ,  not only will the 
di rection of the church be influenced but also its every significant 
step will be presc ribed . How s e rious the consequences are c an already be 
se en in the fact that unde r such cond itions long- term mi nisterial 
planning is imposs ible . It is of no use to plan in advance , when one can 
never pr edict to what the state will consent . If one forward step 
succeeds , then it pertains only to one specific concre te need of the 
chur ch . In any case , it i s  always only a small step .  
3 
ln thi s age of " r elations of a new type , "  the supervi sion and 
direct ing takes place in a more pleasant , negotiable manne r ,  that mean s ,  
in an obliging way, pe rmi ts requests,  grant s counsel , states reason s for 
refusal s ,  avoiding threa ts and obvious means of pressure . In order to 
avoid turbulence in the relationship between state and church--and one 
- 6 -
always means the church needing to avoid turbulence--the stat.e strives 
to make the ecclesiastical negotiating partner complaisant. This is not 
all too difficult because the bishops know only too well that they must 
repeatedly appear as petitioners before the authorities. And, lastly, 
there are unlimited possibilities available that reward cooperativeness, 
or , conversely, to allude to the consequences which would follow in case 
of disturbed relations. 
The authorities negotiate only with the individual bishops and 
never with the entire episcopal collegium. In matters that affect 
everyo ne, they confer with the leader of the Bishops' Conference. This 
method of the state, to only negotiate with individual persons, becomes 
exceedingly opportune, since in Hungary the chairman of the Bishops' 
Conference is not elected--and hence there are no frequent changes--but 
that, according to the statutes the Archbishop of Esztergom automati­
cally holds this position. If he is unable t o  do so, the Archbishop of 
Kalocsa represents him . Having in advance determined a chairman of the 
Bishops' Conference is not very helpful for the church. 
A further complication makes it easier for the st ate to legitimate 
its influence. Although the statutes of the Hungarian Bishops' 
Conference require that the official contacts between the representa­
tives of the church a nd state must be conducted in writing, or that 
verbal negotiations should be transcribed in the form of a Protocol, 
this provision has never been honored. Because the negotiations are 
handled by individuals representing the church, the lack of a formal 
Protocol which documents the content of the negotiations is frequently 
disadvantageous for the church. 
The Bishops 
Before discussing the influence of the state upon the bishop's 
personal problems, I would like to stress that the hierarchs in Hungary 
at this time can be considered persons of integrity. Their education, 
like their human qualities, are no better or worse than those of the 
Hu ngarian priesthood in general; in fa ct, that the state had sanctioned 
their appointment does not mean that they were totally committed to the 
state. They work within the existing system without necessarily 
wholeheartedly embracing it. But it is naturally also clear that the 
- 7 -
state has many more possibilities than the Holy See, which it also uses 
quite systematically to probe the persons nominated for the position of 
bishop. The authorities are thoroughly informed about each individual 
candidate; one knows his way of thinking , can estimate how much he can 
f 
put up with and to what extent he can be church-politically pressured. 
The authorities can then prepare thernsel ves, adjusting their endeavors 
in penetrating the church according to each individual bishop. 
Also working against the welfare of the church is the fact that the 
new episcopal candidates belong to that generation which no longer has 
the possibilities to develop leadership qualities in an ·episcopal 
professorship and to gather experience in the area of leading a diocese. 
As cl ergymen they might have performed their functions outstandingly, 
I 
but that still does not enable them to efficiently take over leading 
positions and to make decisions with far-n:aching ramifications in 
matters that cannot be directly overseen. �t'heir political education, 
their knowled ge of universal church matters, are quite insufficient in 
jud ging specific occurrences and in reacting appropriately. Their 
personal stance is theref ore made more difficult because they are unable 
to choose their own subordinates. Contact with priests within the 
diocese is also maintained with some d ifficulty. They sit isolated upon 
their episcopal chair, practically left to themselves. Their possibili­
ties to develop initiatives in the area of ministerial responsibilities, 
as alread y mentioned, are also very limited. And when their priests are 
struggling with difficulties and expect the bishops to stand by them and 
give them advice, they have little to offer and therefore receive little 
respect. At the same time, as leaders of the church, they are 
responsible for all concerns and problems, with which those thrust to 
the periphery of the church by society must contend . 
With this background it is understandable that the bishops found 
critical differences in opinion about their administration corning from 
abroad quite u nfair and, therefore, they complained. Those living in 
foreign countries, they thought, should not express their concern by 
means of well-intended advice or even criticism, but by understanding 
th eir domestic situation. The problem of the Hungarian bishops who find 
themselves in a field of tension between loyalty and opposition cannot 
be dep icted in such a manner that one blames the "too weak bishops" for 
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every t hing, setting them up as scapegoats. However, nor should it be 
done in such a way that one be content with simply "understanding" their 
situation and--looking beyond all shortcomings--simply ignore all 
pr esent church problems and tasks. 
Politicization of the Church 
The last section of this analysis attempts to present a summary 
view of the results that have brought to maturity the development of the 
aspect categorized as the "politicization of 'the church. " 
Politicization means transformation according to the principle of 
political advantage. When, by the appoin'.:ment of the key church 
positions, the bestowal of clerical distinctions, the planning of 
clerical programs, the solution of conflict situations, the vie\oJS of the 
state are always taken into consideration o:r.- even given priority , a 
counterselection develops whereby the church finds itself in an identity 
crisis that is no less dangerous than persecution. The continuous 
"serving two masters, " the juggling and compromising between the 
political v iewpoints of the state and the demands of the gospel, sooner 
or later must lead to uncertainty and resignation. Consequently, an 
identity crisis is then practically unavoidable within the church. 
The church-political ideology does t ry to establish a new identity 
on its own by offering its guiding principles and guidelines in terms of 
"the construction of socialism. " In this manner, the church can claim 
that it has mediated a "spiritual-emotional asset" to the believers, by 
which these individuals would become righteous and honest members of 
society , who can deal more adequately with life 1 s frustrations, manage 
better marriages, agree to have more children, protest less frequentl y ,  
etc. For the church as such, however, the situation thereby does not 
become more positive. Self-interpretation of this kind does make it 
easier for the church to find the modus vivendi within the state. 
Essentially , though, the church 1 s indent� ty crisis heightened rather 
than eased because of the ceaseless desire for a better position on the 
part of the church . 
The church is furthermore seen as being a type of "trade-union" of 
religious people, that en sures order among the members and stays in 
contact with the state. Because of its posjtive attitude toward the 
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official aims of society, it fulfills an important function in the 
interest and for the promotion of national unity. One should not neglect 
the contacts of the church with foreign countries which present a 
considerable factor of prestige for the nation. 
Along these lines, the church was able to adapt itself to the given 
social 'constellation. I deologically stated, "the church has found its 
place in the building- up of socialism," under which it can naturally be 
understood that the church is to submit to the mechanisms of the state's 
executive power. 
Loyalty and Opposition 
It is clear that those visions for the future which the state 
intends for the church do not suffice� Nevertheless, the church must 
fulfill its mission and live with the facts. The reality is indeed not 
easy; the church is confronted with the rejection of ideological 
plurality, with the monopolistic claim of the state for child and youth 
education, with handicaps in the carrying out of ministerial duties, 
with influence ped dling in the personnel appointments to ecclesiastical 
positions, etc. These are fields of tension for the church, and yet the 
church is not permitted to seek alternatives. It is not allowed to take 
the standpoint of "loyalty or opposition," but must accept both 
attitu des. Therewith, the church can relate to all matters- - even the 
almighty state executive power. Then, by securing a certain degree of 
legality, the church gradually "purchases" a certain measure of 
individual and social freedom, an environment (i. e. milieu) in which 
community and sacramental life can be witnessed and practiced in a truly 
human manner. 
The Hu ngarian catholic Church, having lived between the altar and 
throne for hundreds of years, must learn a new language in order to be 
able to accept the attitu de of "loyalty �nd opposition. " This language 
must, on the one hand, bear witness to the gospel in a non-ambiguous 
manner, in order to secure the respect of the atheistic state, which 
stands unsympathetic vis-a- vis the faith and religion of the Christian. 
On the other hand, the church must learn to adapt itself to the state's 
methods of political struggle. The "familiar liaison" established 
throughout the centuries no longer exists; in its place must appear a 
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politically balanced Christian behavior. Several preconditions must be 
co nsidered as given: there exists no doubt that the political leadership 
wishes the cooperation of the church in the "construction of socialism," 
and thereby the church receives a firmer standing in the life of the 
land.  
In the meant ime, there still exists a large chasm in respect to the 
f uture functions of the church between the conceptions of Mar xist 
ideology and clerical self-understanding . The church looks for its own 
place a nd must, thereby, become active. In this way, it must produce the 
proof for the pastoral need of the faithful and, namely--in order to 
achieve political validity--with the active support of the faithful 
believers themselves. The church must realize its interests by 
concretizing them on its own, formulating and sorting the attitudes, and 
representing them before the state in an objective and determined 
manner. Likewise, the church must also insist on pursuing a written form 
of handling the negotiations between church and state representatives. 
The political logic, on which the relations between the church and state 
are founded, must appropriately follow that with each step the church 
will come forth with additional demands and will insist on everyone 
receiving reciprocal concessions from the state for any concessions the 
church must make. 
Th e acquisition and perfecting of this new negotiating language is 
the supposition that the church, which "had found its place in the 
bu ilding up of socialism," can clearly establish its legal position in 
the political and social environment. This pertains to all areas of life 
and spheres of interest of the church, in which it can call upon 
concrete, defined rights, like religious instruction, work with the 
youth, pastoral duties, building of churches, decisions over clerical 
appointments, i. e. in all areas in which the state only has the right to 
control the activities of the church yet is not allowed to get involved 
in the d irection of their implementation. In other words, in all areas 
in which the autonomy of the church should obtain a firm, defined 
structure. Most important for the Hungarian Catholic Church, which 
instead of a harmonious relationship had to discover a differ ent kind of 
co-existence with the state after the war, is to learn, as soon as 
possible, to assume a differentiated attitu de vis-a-vis the state, which 
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consists of both loyalty and opposition. 
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